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The Government of Cameroon has declared poverty 
reduction through strong and sustainable economic 
growth the central objective of its socioeconomic policy. 
This paper uses available household survey data to assess 
the performance of the economy with respect to this 
objective over the period 1996–2007. The authors use 
counterfactual decompositions based on both the Shapley 
method and the generalized Oaxaca-Blinder framework 
to identify proximate factors that might explain 
differences in observed outcomes over time, across regions 
and households. The concept of pro-poorness provides a 
basis for a normative evaluation of these outcomes. The 
analysis of changes in the size distribution of economic 
welfare reveals that formal sector employment, access to 
credit, education, and urban residence are characteristics 
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that bring significantly high returns to households. 
Employment in smallholder agriculture has a negative 
impact on welfare across quantiles. Economic growth was 
accompanied by significant poverty reduction between 
1996 and 2001. But poverty barely decreased between 
2001 and 2007 due to very weak growth. Over the 
same period, household investment in human capital 
took a serious hit. Given the additional finding that the 
pattern of growth is characterized by urban bias and 
regional disparity, the overall assessment is that economic 
growth has been weakly pro-poor in Cameroon. There is 
therefore a need to re-examine and possibly reform the 
mechanisms governing the allocation of public resources 
designed to support individuals’ efforts to improve their 
standard of living. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
  Promoting economic growth and poverty reduction has long been recognized as 
an important goal of development.  The first World Development Report (WDR) argues 
that development efforts should be aimed at the twin objectives of rapid growth and 
poverty reduction
1 (World Bank 1978).  This vision of development has been reiterated in 
one form or another in subsequent reports culminating in a conception of development as 
opportunity equalization presented in WDR 2006 (World Bank 2005).  In this context, 
equity is defined in terms of a level playing field where individuals have equal 
opportunities to pursue freely chosen life plans and are spared from extreme deprivation 
in outcomes.  In this sense, the pursuit of equity also entails that of poverty reduction. 
  Consistent with the Millennium Declaration
2 (United Nations 2000), the 
Government of Cameroon has declared poverty reduction through strong and sustainable 
economic growth the central objective of ongoing policy reforms (Government of 
Cameroon 2003).  On the basis of this declaration, poverty reduction becomes the 
yardstick by which to judge the performance of development interventions in Cameroon. 
  For the past twenty years or so, Cameroon has been battling a severe and 
persistent socioeconomic crisis that can be traced back to a terms-of-trade shock in the 
mid 1980s and the associated policy response.  Prior to that crisis, the country enjoyed 
steady economic growth and relative social stability.  For about 20 years following 
independence in 1960, the average annual growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
hovered around 5 percent.  That growth was driven mainly by the agricultural sector 
which employed more than 80 percent of the labor force and accounted for 32 percent of 
GDP.  This sector was also a major contributor to export earnings through mainly cocoa 
                                                 
1 This recommendation is consistent with the theme underlying the study of redistribution with growth by 
Chenery et al. (1974).  This study advocates the use of explicit social objectives as a basis for choosing 
development policies and programs.  In particular, any development intervention must be evaluated in 
terms of the benefits it provides to different socio-economic groups. 
2 This Declaration defines the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for the year 2015 relative to 1990.  
The original list of MDGs includes: (1) Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) Achieve universal 
primary education; (3) Promote gender equity and empower women; (4) Reduce child mortality; (5) 
Improve maternal health; (6) Combat major diseases; (7) Ensure environmental sustainability; and (8) 
Develop global partnership for development.   3
and coffee (Benjamin and Devarajan 1986).  The manufacturing sector accounted for 
about 25 percent of GDP and was mainly involved in import-substituting activities. 
  Cameroon became an oil producer in 1978 following the discovery of oil off the 
west coast of the country.  This presented policymakers with a new set of opportunities 
and challenges.  At that point in time, poor infrastructure and low levels of human capital 
were considered serious obstacles to development efforts.  Some of the oil revenues could 
then be invested in capital formation.  At the same time, there was a risk of Dutch 
disease
3 whereby traditional exports such as cocoa and coffee would lose competitiveness 
in the world markets as a result of domestic inflation induced by a rapid spending of oil 
revenues.  In the early 1980s, the oil sector began to take over from the agricultural sector 
as the engine of growth.  Between 1977 and 1981 the average rate of economic growth 
was about 14 percent and dropped to about 7.5 percent per year between 1982 and 1986 
(Blandford et al. 1994).  The share of the oil sector in GDP grew steadily from 1 percent 
in 1978 to 20 percent in 1985.  During the same period the share of agriculture declined 
from about 29 percent to about 21 percent.  Furthermore, the share of petroleum and oil 
products in exports increased form 3 percent to 65 percent while that of agricultural 
products plummeted from 87 percent to 27 percent. 
  The constant and steady growth achieved throughout the 1970s and 1980s earned 
Cameroon the title of middle-income country, a World Bank classification it shared with 
countries such as Indonesia, Morocco, Thailand and Tunisia.  Cameroon’s per capita 
GNP in 1988 dollars was estimated at US $1,010 (World Bank 1990).  These positive 
achievements in economic growth were generally attributed to fiscal prudence and 
political stability.  The World Development Report of 1988 did praise Cameroon along 
with Indonesia for managing cautiously the windfall from the 1979-1981 oil boom.  It is 
reported that Cameroon saved up to 75 percent of the oil revenues abroad, and after the 
boom, ensured that expenditure grew slower than revenues in order to avoid deficits 
(World Bank 1988). 
  The fact that Cameroon did enjoy high and sustained economic growth 
throughout the 1965-1985 has been abundantly documented (Bradford et al. 1994, World 
                                                 
3 This term refers to the deterioration of the Netherlands’ export competitiveness associated with the 
exploitation of natural gas fields in the 1970s (Benjamin and Devarajan 1985). 
   4
Bank 1995).  However, little is known about trends in poverty and inequality during those 
“good” times for lack of data.  Based on the 1983 Household expenditure Survey, the 
World Bank (1995) found evidence of high levels of rural poverty and inequality in the 
distribution of income.  The same report discusses factors indicating that the situation 
may not have been much better in years prior to the 1983 survey.  While acknowledging 
that many urban residents did benefit from this growth episode, the report points to the 
following factors as contributing to high rural poverty: (1) an incentive structure that 
favored capital-intensive methods of production over labor-intensive ones; (2) an urban 
bias in the selection of public investment; and (3) the lack of human capital development 
in the rural areas. 
  In 1985, the economy was hit by a collapse of world prices of the country’s major 
export commodities, namely oil, cocoa and coffee.  This was further complicated by a 40 
percent appreciation of the CFA franc between 1985 and 1988, and gains in 
competitiveness by Nigeria since 1985.  The export price index fell by 65 percent for oil, 
24 percent for cocoa, 11 percent for coffee and 20 percent for rubber (Bradford et al. 
1994).  Faced with this difficult international environment, the government adopted 
initially a strategy of internal adjustment
4 between 1985 and 1993.  This entailed cutting 
back on public spending (mainly investment spending) and building up arrears.  This 
policy choice was in part dictated by the fact that, as a member of the franc zone, 
Cameroon did not have the option of adjusting the nominal exchange rate to deal with the 
terms of trade shocks.  Early 1989, Cameroon entered a structural adjustment supported 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the African Development 
Bank. 
The crisis and the initial response to it led to a severe recession and increased 
poverty (World Bank 1995).  It is reported that by 1990, real GDP stood 20 percent 
below its 1985 level.  Furthermore, per capita income fell by about 50 percent between 
1986 and 1993.  The loss of competitiveness also led to the loss of export markets for 
agricultural products and made it hard for domestic food crops and industrial products to 
compete with imports.  This squeeze implied a decrease of demand for labor both for 
                                                 
4 This point in time also marks the abandonment of five-year plans for socioeconomic management.  The 
last one was the 5
th Five Year Development Plan covering the 1982-1986’s period.   5
tradable and non-tradable goods with adverse effects on living standards for both rural 
and urban areas.  Also, reduced economic activity combined with a slackening of tax 
collection crippled the ability of the state to provide services, thus worsening the 
impoverishment. 
  In 1994, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community
5 of which 
Cameroon is a member devalued the CFA franc by about 50 percent in nominal terms (30 
percent real), and implemented additional trade and fiscal reforms.  This presented 
Cameroon with an opportunity to reverse the socioeconomic downturn.  The country did 
experience some positive growth after the devaluation, but it was only in mid 1996, after 
some failed stabilization and adjustment efforts, that the government showed strong 
commitment to meaningful policy reforms.  The successful implementation of these 
reforms let to macroeconomic stability and an average growth rate of real GDP in the 
neighborhood of 5 percent between 1997 and 2000.  On the basis of the 1996 and 2001 
household surveys, it is estimated that the incidence of poverty fell by 13 percentage 
points from about 53 percent to about 40 percent.  However, income inequality remained 
high with the Gini index of inequality decreasing only by 3 percentage points, from 44 to 
41 percent.  Furthermore, other social indicators have not shown such an improvement. 
  A shift in borrowing strategy around 1986 combined with the severity of the 
socioeconomic crisis left the country saddled with an unsustainable debt burden.  The 
stock of external debt increased from less than 33 percent to more than 75 percent of 
GDP between 1985 and 1993 (Government of Cameroon 2003).  In October 2000, 
Cameroon became eligible for debt relief under the Enhanced HIPC
6 Initiative.  In this 
                                                 
5 Mostly known under its French acronym CEMAC for Communauté Economique et Monétaire d’Afrique 
Centrale. 
6 HIPC stands for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries.  This initiative was launched in 1996 by the 
International Development Association (IDA, the World Bank’s fund designed to provide concessional 
credits and grants to the poorest countries) and the IMF.  The initiative was enhanced in 1999 to tighten its 
link with poverty reduction and to widen its scope and make it more efficient (in terms of speed of relief 
delivery).  Eligibility is based on three criteria: (1) qualify only for concessional assistance from IDA, (2) 
debt situation remains unsustainable after full application of traditional relief mechanisms, and (3) a track 
record of reforms combined with the development of a Poverty Reduction Strategy (presented in a 
document known as Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper or PRSP).  The whole process entails reaching a 
Decision Point and a Completion Point.  Two conditions must be met by a country to reach the Decision 
Point: (1) satisfactory preparation of an interim PRSP, and (2) satisfactory performance under the IMF’s 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).  At this point, the country gets conditional (on continued 
good performance) interim relief.  At the Completion Point debt relief becomes irrevocable.  Reaching this 
point requires the following: (1) maintain macroeconomic stability under a PGRF; (2) satisfactory   6
context, the government adopted a Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) in 2003.  The 
strategy is designed to cut the number of poor by half by 2015 through strong and 
sustainable economic growth.  Cameroon reached the Completion Point in May 2006, 
after three full years of implementation of the 2003 PRS.  This achievement signals the 
satisfaction of Cameroon’s development partners with the implementation of this 
strategy. 
How much poverty reduction has this improved policy environment brought 
about?  Preliminary analysis by the National Statistical Office based on the most recent 
household survey (2007) indicates that the overall incidence of poverty is still around 40 
percent, about the same level as in 2001.  The Gini index of inequality seems to have 
dropped a couple of percentage points from 41 percent in 2001 to 39 percent in 2007.  
These observations raise some interesting evaluative questions.  To what extent has 
growth been pro-poor in Cameroon?  What are the proximate causes of observed 
variations (over time and across socioeconomic groups) in the distribution of economic 
welfare? 
The purpose of this paper is to use available household level data, particularly the 
2001 and 2007 surveys, to try to answer these questions using counterfactual 
decomposition of changes in the distribution of economic welfare.  To put things into 
perspective, we present in section 2 a profile of growth, inequality and poverty for the 
period 1996-2007.  In that section we use the Shapley decomposition to explain 
variations in poverty in terms of changes in per capita expenditure and changes in 
inequality. 
In section 3 we explain the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition framework and use it 
to identify sources of variation in the distribution of economic welfare.  In general, this 
decomposition technique can be used to study group differences in any continuous and 
unbounded outcome variable.  For policymaking purposes, we need to understand the 
nature of the changes in the distribution of welfare associated with the process of 
economic growth.  While the Shapley decomposition limits this understanding to changes 
in mean welfare and inequality, the generalized Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition as 
                                                                                                                                                 
implementation of a full PRSP for one year; (3) implementation of structural and social reforms agreed 
upon at the Decision Point.   7
explained by Bourguignon and Ferreira (2005) allows a much richer analysis
7.  However, 
both methods base the identification of the determinants of differences across 
distributions of economic welfare on the comparison of counterfactual distributions with 
observed ones.  The empirical implementation relies on regression analysis (OLS and 
Quantile). 
In section 4 we use measures of pro-poorness from the recent literature to 
ascertain the extent to which economic growth has been pro-poor in Cameroon.   
Ultimately, impact analysis entails a comparison of social states (or states of the world) 
represented by profiles of individual outcomes.  In this paper, social states are interpreted 
as growth patterns represented by growth incidence curves (GICs).  The social 
desirability of a pattern of growth depends on the chosen social evaluation function.  The 
social evaluation functions used here can be written as a weighted sum of points on the 
GIC.  The specification of the relevant weights hinges on the underlying value 
judgments.  Concluding remarks are made in section 5. 
 
2.  A Profile of Growth, Inequality and Poverty 
 
  In this section, we present a summary of the three datasets we use in the analysis.  
We also discuss the observed poverty outcomes and try to link them to changes in per 
capita expenditure and inequality. 
 
Evolution of per capita Income and Inequality 
 
Table 2.1.  Distribution of Per Adult Equivalent Annual Expenditure in Cameroon (1996-2007) 
 
 Mean  Lowest 
Decile 
2nd 3rd 4th  5
th 6th 7th  8th  9th 10th 
1996 243262.2  2.89  3.78 4.88 6.66 7.26 8.04  7.99  10.45 13.94 34.10 
2001 372742.6  2.64  4.00 5.19 6.79 6.67 8.59 10.07 11.56 15.59 28.90 
2007 432894.2  2.70  3.95 4.74 6.22 7.74 9.30 10.65 12.87 16.64 25.19 
Source: Authors’ Calculations (using data from the 1996, 2001 and 2007 household surveys) 
 
                                                 
7 Within this framework outcome differentials are explained in terms of individual (or household) 
endowments (or characteristics) and the returns to those assets.   8
  Table 2.1 presents a summary of the distribution of per adult equivalent
8 
expenditure based on the 1996, 2001 and 2007 household surveys conducted by the 
National Statistical Office.  All these surveys follow the sampling frame of the 1987 
population census.  The samples are stratified and the 1996 survey has the smallest 
sample size with 1,728 observations 36 percent of which represent the rural sector.  The 
National Statistical Office (2002) has noted this under-representation of the rural areas in 
the 1996 household survey.  For the other two surveys, the sample size is 10,992 
observations for 2001 and 11,391 observations for 2007. 
On the basis of the means reported in the second column of table 2.1, we find that 
(see table 2.2) the average per adult equivalent expenditure grew 5.4 percent per year 
over the period of 1996-2007 in nominal terms.  Looking within sub-periods, the mean 
per adult equivalent expenditure grew by about 9 percent per year between 1996 and 
2001, and by about 2.5 per year between 2001 and 2007.  In real terms, these average 
rates of growth fall respectively to 1.9 percent, 4.1 percent and 0.5 percent.  National 
account statistics tell a different story.  The real per capita GDP is believed to have grown 
only by 1.57 percent per year between 1996 and 2001, and by 0.57 percent between 2001 
and 2007 (National Statistical Office 2002, 2008). 
Table 2.2. Growth in Average per Adult Equivalent Expenditure in Cameroon 
(1996-2007) 
Period  Average Growth Rate (percentage) 
 Nominal  Real 
1996-2001 9.0  4.1 
2001-2007 2.5  0.5 
1996-2007 5.4  1.9 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
 
 
                                                 
8 The underlying scale assigns weights to individual members of the household according to their age and 
gender.  However there is no gender differential for children up to the age of 10.  Thus children who are at 
most 1 year old get a weight of 0.255.  Those with age between 1 and 3 years get assigned a weight of 0.45.  
Between the age of 4 and 6, the weight is 0.62 while it is 0.69 for the 7-10 age group.  Starting from age 11, 
males get assigned the following weights: 0.86 between 11 and 14, 1.03 between 15 and 18, 1 between 19 
and 50 and 0.79 above 50.  All females between 11 and 50 get a weight of 0.76 and those above 50 get a 
weight of 0.66.   9
According to the National Statistical Office, there are at least five factors that 
explain the level of economic growth achieved between 1996 and 2001.  These include: 
(1) a good performance of the export sector, particularly coffee, cocoa and cotton; (2) 
investments associated with the privatization program; (3) the expansion of the timber 
industry; (4) increased salaries in the public sector; and (5) job creation and multiplier 
effects associated with the construction of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline.  The National 
Statistical Office also explains that the poor performance of the economy between 2001 
and 2007 is due mainly to the fact that growth occurred in low productivity sectors such 
as the urban informal sector and traditional agriculture. 
  The data presented in table 2.1 also reveal a significant amount of inequality in 
the distribution of per adult equivalent expenditure.  The share of the richest decile is 
equal to almost 12 times that of the poorest decile in 1996, about 11 times in 2001 and 
9.3 times in 2007.  Furthermore we note that, for all three years, the share of expenditure 
of every decile up to the sixth is strictly less than its population share (10 percent).  For 
the seventh decile, the share of expenditure is about 8 percent in 1996, and a little over 10 
percent in 2001 and 2007.  The Gini measure of inequality has hovered around 40 percent 
in 1996 and 2001 and declined slightly to about 39 percent in 2007. 
 
Changes in Poverty over Time 
 
Figure 2.1 presents a picture summarizing the evolution of aggregate poverty from 1996 
to 2007 based on TIP curves associated with poverty measures which are members of the 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) family.  The acronym TIP stands for the three I’s of 
poverty because the curve provides a graphical summary of incidence,  intensity and 
inequality dimensions of aggregate poverty based on the distribution of poverty gaps 
(Jenkins and Lambert (1997)
9.  These dimensions are shown as follows:  (1) the length of 
the non-horizontal section of the curve reveals poverty incidence ; (2) the intensity aspect 
of poverty is represented by the height of the curve; and (3) the degree of concavity of the 
                                                 
9 This curve is constructed in four steps: (1) rank individuals from poorest to richest on the basis of the 
welfare indicator y; (2) compute the relative poverty gap of individual i as gi=max{(1-yi/z), 0} where z is 
the poverty line; (3) form the cumulative sum of the relative poverty gaps divided by population size; and 
(4) plot the resulting cumulative sum of poverty gaps as a function of the cumulative population share.   10
non-horizontal section of the curve translates into the degree of inequality among the 
poor. 
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Table 2.3.  A Profile of Poverty and Inequality, 1996-2007  
 
 Overall  Urban  Rural 
  1996 2001 2007 1996 2001 2007 1996 2001 2007 
Headcount  53.26 40.18 39.90 41.39 17.88 12.17 59.62 52.08 55.04 
Poverty  Gap  19.09 12.79 12.31 14.67  4.28  2.81 21.46 17.32 17.50 
Squared Poverty Gap  9.00  5.55  5.03  6.92  1.59  0.96  10.12  7.67  7.24 
Watts  26.66 17.38 16.11 20.55  5.48  3.51 29.94 23.72 22.99 
Atkinson  (1)  23.84 24.00 21.94 28.72 24.31 18.59 17.81 16.63 15.35 
Atkinson(2)  38.16 38.82 35.82 45.63 38.25 31.85 30.38 29.72 25.93 
Gini  40.63 40.41 38.96 44.91 40.71 35.19 34.60 33.15 32.23 
MLD  27.23 27.45 24.77 33.86 27.85 20.56 19.61 18.19 16.66 
Theil  31.75 33.75 27.88 37.64 35.39 22.87 21.61 19.36 18.76 
Source: Authors’ Calculations (MLD stands for Mean Log Deviation). 
 
  Figure 2.1 is consistent with the poverty outcomes presented in table 2.3, showing 
that poverty incidence dropped from about 53.3 percent in 1996 to about 40.2 percent and 
40 percent in 2001 and 2007 respectively.  The other three measures reported in that same 
table (the poverty gap, the squared poverty gap and the Watts measure) show a similar 
decline.  These other three measures are members of the additively decomposable
10 class 
of poverty indices defined by the following equation. 
   
z
dy y f z y P
0 ) ( ) | (         (2.1) 
where z is the poverty line, f(y) is the frequency density function for the welfare indicator 
y, and  ) | ( z y   is a convex and decreasing function measuring individual deprivation. 
This function is equal to zero when the welfare indicator is greater or equal to the poverty 
line. 
  To begin to uncover some of the factors that might explain the observed changes 
in poverty between 1996 and 2007, we start from that fact that poverty indices are 
computed on the basis of a distribution of living standards which is fully characterized by 
its mean and the degree of inequality (as represented by the associated Lorenz curve).  
Any poverty measure therefore is a function of these two factors.  Formally we write this 
as ) , , ( z L P P t t t   .  In other words, poverty at time t is a function of the mean, t, the 
                                                 
10 The class of poverty measures defined by (2.1) is additively separable because the deprivation felt by an 
individual depends only on a fixed poverty line and her/his level of welfare and not on the welfare of other 
individuals in society.  When the population is divided exhaustively into mutually exclusive socioeconomic 
groups, this class of measures allows one to compute the overall poverty as a weighted average of poverty 
in each group.  The weights here are equal to population shares.  Thus such indices are also additively 
decomposable   12
Lorenz function, Lt, and the poverty line, z, (assumed constant over time).  We can use 
counterfactual decompositions to sort out the contribution of each of these factors to 
changes in overall poverty.  The basic idea underlying such decompositions is to compare 
observed poverty outcomes to what they would have been under some counterfactual 
state defined by letting only one factor vary while holding all other factors fixed.  In 
particular and given a fixed poverty line, we use the Shapley decomposition
11 method to 
identify the contributions of changes in the mean and relative inequality to the overall 
change in poverty. 
  The Shapley decomposition rule respects the following restrictions: (1) Symmetry 
or anonymity (the contribution assigned to any factor should not depend on its label or 
the way it is listed; (2) the rule should lead to exact or additive decomposition; and (3) the 
contribution of each factor is taken to be equal to its (first round) marginal impact. 
To see clearly how this works in the context of poverty outcomes, consider the 
following change in poverty between two time periods: 
) , , ( ) , , ( 1 1 z L P z L P P t t t t        .  The marginal impact of the change in the mean of the 
distribution is equal to the change in poverty that would have been observed had relative 
inequality remained constant.  If relative inequality is fixed at the first period Lorenz 
function, then this marginal effect can be computed from: 
) , , ( ) , , ( 1 1 1 z L P z L P P t t t t          .  Scaling up the initial distribution by a factor equal 





 produces a counterfactual distribution with the same Lorenz function as 
the initial distribution and the same mean as the end-period distribution
12.  This is a 
distribution-neutral transformation.  Alternatively, we could fix the end period Lorenz 
function to get:  ) , , ( ) , , ( 1 z L P z L P P t t t t        .  In order to respect anonymity, the 
                                                 
11 The Shapley decomposition is based on a microeconomic approach to distributive justice where the key 
issue is a fair assessment of the productive contributions of partners in a joint venture. The Shapley value of 
a participant is in general a solution to a cooperative game.  If players join the game sequentially, the value 
of a player is her net addition to overall payoff when she joins.  The Shapley value is the average 
contribution to the payoff over all possible orderings of the participants. For more on the use of the Shapley 
value in inequality and poverty analysis, see Shorrocks (1999).  Kakwani (200) proposes a similar 
decomposition using an axiomatic approach.  Datt and Ravallion (1992) offer a decomposition technique 
that splits a change in poverty between two dates into a growth component, a redistribution component and 
a residual.  They interpret this residual as an interaction term. 
12 See Lambert (2001) and Kakwani and Son (2008) for applications of this transformation.   13
Shapley contribution of changes in the mean, S, to change in poverty is equal to the 
average of these two marginal effects.  We refer to this term as the scale component and 
we write it as follows. 
  z L P z L P z L P z L P S t t t t t t t t , , ( ) , , (
2
1
) , , ( ) , , (
2
1
1 1 1 1                 (2.2) 
 
Similarly, we can show that the contribution of the change in inequality to change in 
poverty, ceteris paribus, is equal to: 
 
  z L P z L P z L P z L P S t t t t t t t t L , , ( ) , , (
2
1
) , , ( ) , , (
2
1
1 1 1 1                (2.3) 
  Transformations that underlie the computation of the Shapley contribution of 
inequality to change in poverty are size-neutral to the extent they hold the mean of the 
distribution constant while changing the Lorenz function. 
 
Table 2.4.  Shapley Decomposition of Poverty Outcomes, 1996-2007 
 
 Overall Scale  Inequality
 1996-2001 
Headcount -13.08  -12.57  -0.51 
Poverty Gap  -6.30  -6.18  -0.13 
Squared Poverty Gap -3.45  -3.47  0.02 
Watts -9.29  -9.35  0.06 
 2001-2007 
Headcount -0.28  -0.12  -0.16 
Poverty Gap  -0.47  -0.06  -0.41 
Squared Poverty Gap -0.53  -0.03  -0.49 
Watts -1.27  -0.09  -1.17 
 1996-2007 
Headcount -13.36  -12.32  -1.04 
Poverty Gap  -6.78  -6.23  -0.55 
Squared Poverty Gap -3.98  -3.52  -0.46 
Watts -10.55  -9.39  -1.16 
   Source: Authors’ Calculations 
 
  The results of our decomposition over the period 1996-2007 are reported in table 
2.4.  Those associated with the overall period, 1996-2007, suggest that on average both 
changes in the mean per adult equivalent expenditure and in relative inequality associated   14
with the growth process have led to poverty reduction.  The comparison of the 
magnitudes of the Shapley contributions indicates that the pure growth or scale effect 
dominates the inequality effect, except for the sub-period 2001-2007.  The meager 





Aggregate outcomes such as those discussed above can often hide a great deal of 
heterogeneity in the incidence of the growth process on poverty.  This heterogeneity in 
impact also means that we can expect losers during spells of growth, even when poverty 
falls on average as we have observed above (Ravallion 2001).  At this stage we limit our 
consideration of this issue to regional disparities
13.  Table A1 through A4 in the appendix 
present a profile of poverty and inequality for 12 regions of Cameroon (the two major 
cities Douala and Yaoundé, and the 10 provinces) for 2001 and 2007.  The identification 
of winners and losers at the regional level is made on the basis of a comparison of 
regional outcomes to national outcomes.  Focusing for instance on poverty incidence, we 
note that four provinces (Adamaoua, East, North and Far North) experienced a significant 
increase in poverty incidence between 2001 and 2007 while the trend in overall poverty 
was declining.  The two Northern provinces (North and Far North) saw the biggest 
increase.  Poverty incidence increased by 13.6 and 9.6 percentage points respectively in 
the North and Far North.  The increase was 6.4 for the Eastern province and 4.5 points for 
Adamaoua. 
  For each of the two years, 2001 and 2007, we also observe a deviation of regional 
poverty levels from the national average.  It turns out that we can also use a two-way 
Shapley decomposition to identify proximate explanations for these poverty differences 
across regions (Kolenikov and Shorrocks 2005).  Just as in the case of overall poverty, 
regional poverty levels are fully determined by average real income and inequality in its 
distribution.  Therefore, the Shapley contributions now indicate the influence of 
                                                 
13 Later on we present some econometric results which will help us identify winners and losers at the 
household level.   15
deviations of mean (real) income and inequality from the national level.  This 
decomposition allows us to uncover the dominant factor between these two. 
  Our results for some important members of the class of additively decomposable 
poverty measures defined by equation (2.1) are presented in table 2.5 (a&b for 2001 and 
2007 respectively).  There are six regions (the two major cities, and the coastal, western, 
southern and south-western provinces of where poverty is generally below the national 
average in both 2001 and 2007.  Poverty is above the national average for the other six 
regions.  The overall pattern that emerges from these results is that, except for the 
western, southern and south-western provinces, the real income (scale) effect dominates 
(in magnitude) the inequality effect in 9 regions.  Thus regions (among these 9) with 
lower poverty rates than the national average tend to have average real income higher 
than the national average.  Similarly, average real income tends to be lower than the 
national average for those regions (out of 9) with higher poverty rates than the national 
average.  Poverty levels in the West, South and South-West tend to be lower than the 
national average due to lower inequality. 
  The above results suggest that regional disparity in Cameroon is mostly due to 
differences in average real income, an indication of significant between-group inequality.  
The results of similar analysis applied to rural-urban differences for 1996, 2001 and 2007 
are presented in table A5-A7 in the appendix.  These results confirm the urban bias noted 
earlier to the extent that urban poverty is consistently below the national average while 
rural poverty is consistently above.  A close look at the Shapley contributions reveals that 
rural poverty would be much higher than the national average if rural inequality were not 
lower than the national average.  For instance in 2007, the incidence of rural poverty 
would have been about 21 percentage points higher than the national average if rural 
inequality had been at the level of overall inequality.  The observed difference stood at 15 
points because the inequality effect was -6 percentage points. 
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Table 2.5a. Shapley Decomposition of Regional Differences in Poverty for 2001  
 
  Headcount  Poverty Gap  Squared Poverty Gap  Watts 
 Difference  Scale  Inequality  Difference Scale Inequality  Difference Scale Inequality Difference Scale Inequality 
Douala  -29.29 -29.85  0.56  -10.71 -10.52  -0.19  -4.84 -4.64  -0.19  -14.76 -14.32  -0.45 
Yaoundé  -26.84 -30.08  3.24  -10.13 -10.56  0.43  -4.70 -4.73  0.04  -14.10 -14.45  0.35 
Adamaoua  8.20  14.54 -6.34  2.60  7.02 -4.42  0.83  3.70 -2.88  2.94  10.27 -7.33 
Center  8.00  15.07 -7.07  2.19  6.42 -4.24  1.08  3.28 -2.21  3.67  9.40 -5.73 
East  3.80  9.34 -5.54  2.58  5.70 -3.12  1.20  3.07 -1.88  3.48  8.43 -4.95 
Far-North  16.11 22.73  -6.62  6.05 11.11  -5.05 2.62  5.96  -3.33 7.97  16.45  -8.48 
CoastT  -4.70 2.47  -7.17  -2.70 0.71  -3.40 -1.38  0.36  -1.74 -3.95  1.02  -4.97 
North  9.90  13.30 -3.40  2.71  6.36 -3.65  0.81  3.30 -2.49  3.05  9.24 -6.19 
North-West  12.30 12.69  -0.39  8.11  7.08  1.03  5.15 4.10  1.05  13.45 11.00  2.45 
West 0.15  10.17  -10.02  -1.69  4.33  -6.02 -1.36  2.21  -3.57 -3.19  6.22  -9.41 
South  -8.63 3.94  -12.57  -5.43 1.61  -7.04 -3.13  0.76  -3.89 -8.34  2.24  -10.58 
South-West -6.36  -2.49 -3.86 -2.28  -1.05 -1.23 -1.04  -0.54  -0.50 -3.25  -1.53  -1.72 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
 
Table 2.5b. Shapley Decomposition of Regional Differences in Poverty for 2007  
 
  Headcount  Poverty Gap  Squared Poverty Gap  Watts 
 Difference  Scale  Inequality  Difference Scale Inequality Difference Scale Inequality Difference Scale Inequality 
Douala  -34.40  -26.66 -7.73  -11.44  -8.57 -2.87 -4.81  -3.51  -1.30  -15.10  -11.23  -3.88 
Yaoundé  -33.96  -26.34 -7.62  -11.35  -8.54 -2.80 -4.79  -3.55  -1.23  -14.99  -11.25  -3.73 
Adamaoua  13.05  17.73  -4.68 2.17  7.41  -5.23 0.39  3.69  -3.31 2.35  10.51  -8.16 
Center  1.29  14.76  -13.46 -2.83  5.76  -8.59 -1.93  2.69  -4.62 -4.43  7.99  -12.43 
East  10.51  16.43  -5.92 3.37  7.98  -4.61 1.20  4.25  -3.05 4.14  11.57  -7.44 
Far-North 25.97  24.77  1.20  12.26  14.59  -2.33 6.18  8.43  -2.25  17.23  22.02  -4.79 
Coast -8.82  3.09  -11.91  -4.66  1.34  -6.00 -2.32  0.65  -2.97 -6.51  1.87  -8.38 
North  23.76  24.15 -0.39  8.67  12.63 -3.96 3.55  6.68  -3.13  11.32  18.35  -7.03 
North-West  11.10  9.66  1.44 4.30  5.61  -1.31 1.81  3.00  -1.19 5.67  8.15  -2.48 
West -10.95  2.85  -13.80  -5.68  0.98  -6.66 -2.76  0.47  -3.22 -7.87  1.36  -9.23 
South  -10.64  -2.96 -7.68  -4.94  -1.27 -3.67 -2.38  -0.62  -1.76 -6.80 -1.77  -5.03 
South-West -12.39  -4.46  -7.93  -5.45  -1.78  -3.67 -2.55  -0.85  -1.70 -7.46  -2.47  -4.99 
  Source: Authors’ Calculations 
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  To assess the extent of between-group inequality in the distribution of economic 
welfare in Cameroon, we perform a threefold decomposition of the overall Gini measure 
of inequality following the framework proposed by Lambert and Aronson (1993).  These 
authors explain that three basic components account for the overall inequality as 
measured by the Gini coefficient namely: (1) between group inequality, GB, (2) within 
group inequality, GW (3) the extent of overlapping among subgroup distributions, GO  
Let GY be the overall Gini for an income distribution for a population partitioned in m 
groups, then we have the following expression: O W B Y G G G G    .  The within group 
component is known to be equal to a weighted sum of within group Gini coefficients 
where the weight of each group is equal to the product of its population share and its 
income share. 
  Our computation is based on a simple three-step procedure which Lambert and 
Aronson (1993) use to reveal the interrelation between these three components of the 
Gini coefficient.  Like other decompositions used in this paper, this one also relies on a 
counterfactual comparison of distributions.  Suppose that we start from a position of 
perfect equality where every individual (household) receives the overall mean income.  
We can introduce between group inequality by giving everybody, not the overall mean, 
but the mean income of her group.  The Gini coefficient for this new distribution 
measures between group inequality. 
  Next consider the distribution obtained as follows.  Keep individuals lined up by 
increasing order of group means.  Thus all people from the poorest group will appear first 
in the income parade and members of the richest group will all appear last.  Then, within 
each group, give people their actual incomes and sort them by increasing level of income 
within each group.  The resulting distribution is such that the richest person in group (k-
1) finds herself standing next to the poorest person in group k.  By construction, this 
distribution accounts for both between group and within group inequality.  We can net 
the between group component out by subtracting GB from the concentration coefficient of 
this “lexicographic income parade”
14.  This operation yields an estimate of the within 
group component, GW. 
                                                 
14 This terminology is from Lambert and Aronson (1993)   18
  Finally, consider sorting individuals by increasing order of income their actual 
income with no attention paid to group membership.  People are now ranked for the 
overall poorest to the overall richest.  To the extent that there is overlapping between 
subgroup distributions, some people will shift ranks relative to their positions in the 
lexicographic parade.  The extent of this overlapping is measured by subtracting the 
concentration coefficient of the lexicographic distribution (which embeds both the 
between and within group components) from the overall Gini coefficient. 
 
Table 2.6.  A Threefold Decomposition of the Gini Measure of Inequality for 2001&2007 
 
  Level (in percentage) Relative (in percentage)  
 2001  2007  2001  2007 
Between-Group  17.46 19.38  43.21  49.75 
Within-Group  8.26 1.25 20.45  3.21 
Overlapping  14.69 18.33  36.35  47.05 
Overall 40.41  38.96  100  100 
  Source:Authors’  Calculations   
 
 




















Source: Authors’ Calculations 
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Our application of this procedure to data for 2001 and 2007 led to results reported 
in both table 2.6 and figure 2.2.  The decomposition is based on the same groups listed in 
table 2.5.  These results confirm the conclusion we reached on the basis of Shapley 
analysis of regional differences in Poverty.   Between-group inequality is indeed a major 
component of overall inequality (as measured by the Gini Coefficient) in Cameroon.  
This component has increased from 43 percent of the total in 2001 to almost 50 percent in 
2007.  The results also reveal that there is significant overlapping between regional 
distributions and a low level of within group inequality.  This dimension significantly 
declined over time, from about 20 percent in 2001 t0 1 percent in 2007. 
 
3.  Sources of Change in the Distribution of Economic Welfare 
 
Ravallion (2001) argues that disparities in access to human and physical capital, 
and differences in returns to such assets are the main determinants of income inequality.  
Furthermore these disparities are most likely to inhibit overall growth prospects.  The 
promotion of pro-poor economic growth thus entails paying particular attention to these 
factors.  In this section we resort to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition framework to try 
to identify the effect of household characteristics and that of the returns to those 
characteristics on the distribution of economic welfare.  We first explain the structure of 
the framework along with empirical implementation.  We then discuss the results of its 
application to the data at hand. 
 
The Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition Framework 
 
Just as in the case of the Shapley decomposition, the main objective of the 
Oaxaca-Blinder method is to identify the factors that might account for the changes from 
one distribution to another.  Within this framework, we need a model linking the 
outcome of interest to individual (or household) characteristics.  We therefore maintain 
the assumption that the welfare indicator y (e.g. real expenditure) has a joint distribution 
with individual characteristics such as age, education, occupation, area of residence and   20
family size represented by a vector x.  The methodology works for a summary statistic 
such as the conditional mean and for whole distributions. 
  Suppose that we are interested in explaining the difference in conditional mean 
outcome between two distributions.  Following Bauer and Sinning (2008), write the 
conditional mean outcome as  ) , | ( t t t x y E  for t=0, 1.  This expression says that outcome 
y depends on some characteristics x, and the associated parameters, .  The index t could 
stand for two socioeconomic groups such as rural versus urban households or for two 
different time periods.  Here we stick to the time dimension.  The difference in 
conditional means between year 1 and year 0 can be written as. 
 
) , | ( ) , | ( 0 0 0 1 1 1   x y E x y E M           ( 3 . 1 )  
 
Choosing year 0 as a reference group implies the counterfactual mean outcome for year 1 
can be written as:  ) , | ( 0 1 1  x y E .  Adding this value to and subtracting it from (3.1) leads 
to the following general two-fold decomposition. 
 
)] , | ( ) , | ( [ )] , | ( ) , | ( [ 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0     x y E x y E x y E x y E M         (3.2) 
 
The first component on the right hand side is the price effect, the part of the differential 
that is due to differences in coefficients.  That price effect represents how the average 
outcome of in year 1 would change if the observed characteristics were evaluated with 
coefficients applicable to year 0.  The second component represents the endowment effect 
(also known as the composition effect), the part of outcome differential that is due to 
differences in the covariates.  In other words, this component measures the change in the 
average outcome year 0 if the observed characteristics had been those of year 1.   
Similarly, using the end period as reference, we would get the following 
decomposition. 
 
)] , | ( ) , | ( [ )] , | ( ) , | ( [ 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1     x y E x y E x y E x y E M       (3.3) 
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  Again the first term on the right hand side represents the price effect while the 
second term measures the endowment effect
15. 
It is possible to obtain a three-fold decomposition
16 of the form 
) ( ) 3 ( 2 1
*
1 C C B A C B A M          where A stands for the endowment effect using 
the end period as reference, and the B and Ck terms have the structure of a price effect 
(Bauer and Sinning 2008).  The first two components are 
) , | ( ) , | ( 1 0 0 1 1 1   x y E x y E A   ; )] , | ( ) , | ( [ 0 1 1 1 1 1   x y E x y E B   .  The two elements 
of the third component are:  )] , | ( ) , | ( [ 1 1 1 0 1 1 1   x y E x y E C    and 
)] , | ( ) , | ( [ 0 0 0 1 0 0 2   x y E x y E C   . 
For empirical implementation, we need the sample counterpart, ) , (
^
t t x S   of the 
conditional expectation  ) , | ( t t t x y E  .  If we assume that the conditional means are linear 
in parameters, then the above expressions collapse to the standard Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition.  In that case, (3.3) can be written as: 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 )] ( ) ( [ ) )]( ( [    x E x E x E M      .  Sample means are used to estimate E(xt) 
while t are estimated by applying ordinary least squares (OLS) method to group-specific 
equations
17. 
  The basic Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition described above focuses on a statistic 
(namely the mean) summarizing the whole distribution.  A poverty-focused evaluation 
creates a need for ways of decomposing whole distributions so as to explain outcomes in 
the neighborhood of and below the poverty line.  We briefly review how to extend the 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to accommodate whole distributions. 
Let the probability density function  1 , 0 ); , (  t x y Jt  represent the joint 
distribution of y and x (standing for a vector of relevant characteristics).  The generalized 
                                                 
15 In the context of treatment effect analysis we can think of the initial year as representing the control 
group and the end year the treated.  In that case, as noted by Melly (2006) the price effect in (3.2) identifies 
the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET).  When the end year is the reference, the price effect is 
the average treatment effect on the untreated (ATEU).  The endowment effect may be interpreted as 
selection bias. 
16 The third term is in fact an interaction term and can also be written as 
)] , | ( ) , | ( [ )] , | ( ) , | ( [ 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1     x y E x y E x y E x y E C     . 
17 Bauer and Sinning (2008) explain how to apply this methodology to models with discrete or limited 
dependent variables.   22
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is based on the marginal distribution of income,  ) (y ft , 
which can be obtained by integrating the x’s out of the joint density.  For the purpose of 
our decomposition, it is useful to invoke the factorization principle and write the joint 
distribution of income and characteristics as the product of the distribution of income 
conditional on the characteristics,  ) | ( x y gt , and the joint distribution of the 
characteristics, ) (x ht .  These are the two factors driving the generalized Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition.  Any change in the marginal distribution induced by a variation in the 
distribution of characteristics (ceteris paribus) represents the endowment effect, while any 
change in the distribution associated with a variation in the conditional distribution is 
interpreted as the price-behavioral effect (Bourguignon and Ferreira 2005). 
To see clearly what is involved, we express the joint distribution as a product of 
the two underlying distribution:  1 , 0 ); ( ) | ( ) , (   t x h x y g x y J t t t .  On the basis of this 
factorization, we can write the marginal distribution
18 of income in a way that facilitates 
the expression and interpretation of the decomposition, that is: ) ( ) ( y f y f
ht
gt t  .  Thus the 
observed change in the distribution of income between the two periods (or groups) is 
equal to: 
 








g            ( 3 . 4 )  
 






g .  This is the marginal distribution that would obtain if the 
conditional distribution were that of period 0, and the joint distribution of characteristics 
that prevailing in period 1.  This transformation leads us to the following generalized 
decomposition. 
                                                 
18 To clarify our notation, we consider the simplest case where x represents a single characteristic.  No loss 
of generality is involved.  The marginal distribution of y is equal to   
mx
t t dx x y J y f
0 ) , ( ) ( , where mx 




gt dx x h x y g y f
0 ) ( ) | ( ) ( . 
19 In the simple case of one characteristic presented in footnote 18, this counterfactual is defined by: 
 
mx h
g dx x h x y g y f
0 1 0
1
0 ) ( ) | ( ) ( .   23
















g           ( 3 . 5 )  
 
The configuration of the indices (subscripts and superscripts) for the marginal 
distributions involved in (3.5) suggests an interpretation of the various components of the 
decomposition.  The first component on the right hand side is the price-behavioral effect 
(linked to the change in the conditional distribution of income).  The second component 
measures the endowment effect (based on changes in the joint distribution of 
characteristics). 
  Another relevant counterfactual is the marginal distribution associated with the 




g .  Using 
this counterfactual leads to the following decomposition 
 
















g           ( 3 . 6 )  
 
The endowment effect now is computed holding constant the first period (or group) 
conditional distribution.  The price-behavioral effect is computed holding constant the 
distribution of endowments of period 0.  There is no reason why these two 
decompositions should be equivalent.  Thus, this generalized approach
20 also suffers from 
path dependence (Bourguignon and Ferreira 2005). 
  Empirical implementation of this generalized approach requires an estimator of 
the whole conditional distribution (not just of a summary statistic) and a way to derive 
marginal distributions from estimates generated by this estimator.  Our study relies on 
quantile
21 regression to estimate conditional distributions and on the formal link between 
conditional and marginal quantiles. 
                                                 
20 Finally, it is instructive to note that the decomposition principle underlying (3.5) and (3.6) also underlies 
the Shapley decomposition we used in Section 2 of this paper.  In that case, the distribution of income is 
represented by the mean and the Lorenz curve.  Counterfactual distributions are obtained by changing one 
of these factors at a time holding the other one fixed.  In fact, Bourguignon and Ferreira (2005) explain that 
this principle applies to any statistic defined on the distribution of income characterized by the marginal 
density function f(y).  Such statistics include the mean, summary inequality and poverty measures. 
21 Quantile (or fractile) is a cut-off value of a variable such that a given fraction of values lie at or below 
the cut-off point (Freund and Williams 1991).  For instance, the performance of a student on a standardized 
test is said to be at the 
th quantile if a proportion  of scores in the reference group are less than or equal to   24
In general, a regression of a variable y on a set of variables x is any characteristic 
of the probability distribution of y conditional on x which is considered a function of x.  
Regression analysis can usefully be framed within the logic of conditional prediction.  A 
best predictor of y given x minimizes the expected loss associated with the chosen loss 
function.  Any regression can therefore be characterized by the underlying loss function 
(Manski 1991).  Let p(x) denote a predictor for y, L(.) a loss function, and E[L(y-p(x))|x] 
the expected loss associated with predicting y with p, conditional on x.  For a given loss 
function, the value of the best predictor depends exclusively on the probability 
distribution of y conditional on x.  Thus, as a function of x, the best predictor is a 
regression to the extent that it offers a succinct description of how the location of y varies 
with x. 
Quantile regression is characterized by the following absolute loss function. 
 
  , 0 | | ) ( ; 0 | | ) 1 ( ) (      u if u u L u if u u L        ( 3 . 7 )  
 
where  is a specified constant in the interval (0, 1).  The associated best-predictor is the 
-quantile of y conditional on x.  In other words, it is the smallest number q() such that: 
   } | Pr{ x q y .  The underlying loss function is asymmetric except for the case where 
=0.5 which corresponds to the conditional median.  As  increases, the loss function 
penalizes under-predictions of y more heavily than over-predictions. 
Quantile regression is usually defined by writing q() as a function of relevant 
covariates.  Assuming a linear relationship between the conditional quantile of the 
response variable (yi) and the covariates (xi), we write: ) ( )) ( , | (      i i y x x q  .  This 
expression represents the conditional quantile function or CQF (Angrist and Pischke 
2009).  Estimation of the vector of coefficients associated with the conditional quantile 
solves the following mathematical programming problem: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
hers.  Formally, let y be a random variable with probability distribution function } Pr{ ) ( z y z F   .  The 

th quantile of y is the smallest value of y, say q() such that:  1 0 , ) (      z F .  Equivalently we 
write: ) ( } ) ( : inf{ ) (
1   
    F z F z q . 
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n x y       ( 3 . 8 )  
 
where () stands for the loss function, which is also known as the check function.  The 
above problem can indeed be solved by linear programming methods (Koenker 2005). 
  To link conditional quantiles to marginal quantiles, Angrist and Pischke (2009) 
start from the observation that the proportion of the population below q conditional on x 
is equal to the proportion of conditional quantiles that are below q.  Let I(u) be the 
indicator function that takes a value of 1 if its argument is true and 0 otherwise.  Let 
() / x y F  stand for the conditional cumulative distribution function (CDF).  Thus the 
proportion of the population for which the outcome y is less than q is equal to: 




/ / ) | ( ) | ( , where the term on the right hand side is equal to the 
proportion of conditional quantiles
22 that are below q.  Equivalently, we have: 
    d q x I x q F x y   
1
0 / ) ( ) | ( .  The marginal distribution of y, () y F  from which we 
derive the marginal quantiles  ) ( } ) ( : inf{ ) (
1   
    y F z F z q , is obtained by integrating 
the conditional distribution over the whole range of the distribution of the covariates 
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1
0 ) ( ) (.   T h e  
sample analog of this expression based on an estimation of quantile regressions at every 
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     ( 3 . 9 )  
 
                                                 
22 Note that the inverse of the conditional CDF is also the conditional quantile function.  
That is  ) ( )) ( , | ( ) | (
1
/       x x q x F x y  
 . 
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The marginal quantile corresponding to the above estimator of the marginal distribution 
of the response variable is obtained by inverting (3.9).  In other words, 
} ) ( : inf{ )) ( , (
^ ^
      q F q x q y i . 
  The generalized Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition described by equations (3.5) and 
(3.6) can equivalently be stated in terms of these marginal quantiles.  The observed 
change in the marginal distribution of the response variable is now written 




1 1        x q x q q    .  To distinguish the endowment effect from the 
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outcome: )) ( , ( 0
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1    x q .  This counterfactual involves the characteristics of group 1 
evaluated with the prices (coefficients) of period 0.  The corresponding decomposition 
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Again, the first element on the right hand side represents the endowment effect, while the 
second is the price effect.   
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The operating counterfactual
23 in this case is:  )) ( , ( 1
^
0    x q . 
                                                 
23 The two counterfactuals involved in this generalized decomposition are obtained by inverting marginal 
distributions of the form:  1 , 0 , , ] ) ( ) ( [
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Our empirical implementation relies on a Stata routine, rqdeco, written by Melly (2006).  The routine 
decomposes differences in distributions as follows.  The distribution of the outcome variable conditional on 
characteristics is estimated by linear quantile regression.  Both the conditional and unconditional 
distributions are approximated by a number of quantiles supplied by the user.  Unconditional distributions 
are obtained from conditional ones by integration over the regressors.  The difference in outcome between   27
Empirical Results 
 
  The regression framework allows us to analyze the conditional distribution of the 
logarithm of real per adult equivalent expenditure given observed household 
characteristics.  We consider four broad categories of characteristics: (1) Demographics 
(gender of household head, age of household head, and household composition in terms 
of proportions of various age groups up to age 25); (2) Household and community assets 
(years of schooling of head of household, land ownership, access to credit, at least one 
migrant in household, distance to nearest hospital, distance to nearest tarred road); (3) 
Sector of employment (public sector, formal private sector, smallholder agriculture, 
informal non-agriculture, unemployed
24; and (4) Area/province of residence
25. 
Our estimates of the marginal impact of each characteristic on household welfare 
in 2001 and 2007 are reported in tables B1 and B2 in the appendix.  All demographic 
variables are statistically significant.  As expected, an increase in any component of 
household membership reduces welfare.  The male dummy variable has a negative sign in 
2001 and a positive one in 2007.  In other words male-headed household fared better in 
2007 than the reference female-headed household and worse in 2001, other things being 
equal.  Among the non-geographical characteristics, the following have the highest 
positive and statistically significant impact on household welfare: (1) formal sector 
employment (public or private), (2) access to credit and (3) years of schooling of the head 
of household. Interestingly, the impact of public sector employment is consistently higher 
than that of the formal private sector.  Yet the public sector has the reputation of being 
less productive than the private sector.  Having at least one migrant in the household had 
a positive and significant impact on welfare in 2007 and not in 2001.  The coefficient for 
agricultural employment is statistically significant in both years but has a negative sign.  
                                                                                                                                                 
period 1 and 0 at each unconditional quantile is then decomposed (using appropriate counterfactuals) into a 
part that is due to differences in the distribution of characteristics and another that is explained by 
differences in coefficients.  In the context of treatment effect evaluation, if year 0 is the control then the 
price effect in (3.11) is the quantile treatment effect on the treated (QTET).  The related average effect can 
be recovered by integrating over quantiles. 
24 The reference group here is not in the labor force. 
25 Our choice of dummy variables implies that the reference household (conditional on characteristics 
represented by continuous variables) lives in the rural area of the central province with the head out of the 
labor force, has no access to credit and no migrant.   28
This is certainly another manifestation of urban bias noted earlier.  Indeed, these 
regression results confirm that urban residence has a strong positive impact on welfare. 
  The OLS results discussed above give only the average impact of the 
characteristic of interest on household welfare.  We now consider results from quantile 
regression to learn how these impacts vary across quantiles.  It is much easier to deal with 
plots of the coefficient estimates at various quantiles rather than the estimates themselves.  
Fundamentally these plots provide information that can be used to summarize the impact 
of each covariate on inequality in the conditional distribution of real per adult equivalent 
expenditure.  Given that the dependent variable is in log form, the difference in the 
coefficient estimates at two different quantiles is a measure of the impact of the 
corresponding covariates on the log of the ratio real per adult equivalent expenditure at 
these quantiles (Machado and Mata 2005).  To keep our story manageable, we focus on 
three groups of covariates, namely, household assets (education of head, access to credit, 
and having a migrant), sector of employment, and area of residence (urban-rural).  The 
effects of these characteristics are plotted in figures B1 through B7 (in appendix B).  
  Figure B1 shows the impact of years of schooling of the head of household on 
welfare for 2001 and 2007 respectively.  Returns to education (in terms of real per adult 
equivalent expenditure) are positive and statistically significant across all quantiles.  The 
conditional-quantile function for 2001 is right-skewed because the slopes below the 75
th 
quantile are more or less flat while those above are steep.   Not surprisingly, economic 
welfare increases with education over the whole distribution.  In addition, we note that 
(except perhaps for the 10
th quantile), the impact of education was higher in 2001 than in 
2007.  This could be a manifestation of the lack of economic growth experienced by the 
country over that period.  Indeed the lack of employment opportunities for the educated is 
a latent source of social tension in Cameroon. 
  The conditional quantile functions for the returns to access to credit presented in 
figure B2 show a similar pattern as those for education.  The 2001 curve dominates the 
2007 one.  The effects of this covariate are much higher at the top of the distribution than 
at the lower end.  While the returns to access to credit remain positive for all quantiles in 
2007, the corresponding conditional quantile function is much flatter than the one for   29
2001.  These returns are very small for the poorest households and increase steeply past 
the 80
th quantile.  This increase is much lower than the one observed in 2001. 
  The results for the impact of having at least one migrant (figure B3) are 
qualitatively consistent with the OLS discussed earlier.  Having at least one migrant in 
the household in 2001 made no significant difference for any household over the entire 
conditional distribution.  No coefficient in the underlying quantile process is significantly 
different from zero in a statistical sense.  But all these coefficients are greater than zero 
and statistically significant in 2007.  In addition, the associated conditional quantile 
function is skewed to the right because the slopes are more or less flat below the median 
and those above the median increase steeply.  Thus having a migrant in the household 
contributed to increasing inequality in the distribution of welfare in 2007 and not in 2001. 
  With respect to the effects of the sector of employment presented in figures B4, 
B5 and B7, we note that households engaged in agriculture are worse off across quantiles 
and years, than those employed in other sectors of the economy.  Indeed, all coefficients 
are negative and statistically significant so the conditional quantile functions are down-
ward sloping.  This shape implies that the penalty associated with being employed in 
agriculture hurts the households at the lower end of the distribution than those at the top.  
The returns to employment in the formal sector (figures B5&B6) are significantly 
positive in both years and for all quantiles.  But there is a reversal in the pattern of the 
returns to public and formal private sector employment between 2001 and 2007.  In 2001 
both conditional distributions are skewed to the right suggesting that returns to formal 
employment are much higher for households located at the top of the distribution.  The 
conditional quantile function for the public sector dominates that for the formal private 
sector up to the neighborhood of the 90
th quantile.  At that point the latter overtakes the 
former and shoots up dramatically.  This dominance relation between the public sector 
and the formal private sector also prevails in 2007.  However, this time, both functions 
are downward sloping indicating that the economic crisis may have hurt more those 
households at the top of the distribution. 
  On the basis of figure B7 we conclude that urban bias is the bedrock determinant 
of inequality in the distribution of economic welfare in Cameroon and the situation may 
be getting worse.  The conditional quantile distribution function for 2001 has a U-shape   30
with a bottom at about the median.  This indicates that the urban-rural gap was much 
more pronounced at both ends of the distribution compared to households located near 
the median.  The conditional quantile distribution function for 2007 dominates entirely 
that for 2001.  In addition, it is monotonically increasing across quantiles.  The increase 
accelerates past the 80
th quantile.  Rich urban households are thus way better off than 
their rural counterparts. 
  The generalized Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition described earlier provides clues 
that might explain these observed changes in the distribution of economic welfare 
between 2001 and 2007 both overall and for the urban and rural areas. 

















































  Figure 3.1 shows a decomposition of the total difference in the distribution of 
welfare into two components.  The first component shows the part that is due to changes 
in the distribution of characteristics while the second represents the contribution of 
changes in the distribution of returns to those characteristics.  These two components pull 
in opposite direction.  The effect of characteristics is positive and shows a slight decline   31
across quantiles.  The effect of returns to those characteristics is negative and is upward 
sloping. This effect thus tends to be higher in absolute value for richer households. 
 















































  Given the importance of urban bias in the pattern of economic growth in 
Cameroon, we also present a decomposition of the urban-rural differential in 2001 and 
2007 (figures 3.2&3.3).  In both years the total differential is increasing across quantiles.  
The increase is steeper at the top of the distribution.  In 2001 the endowment effect 
dominates the return effect up to the neighborhood of the 95
th quantile.  This pattern is 
reversed in 2007 as the returns effect dominates the endowment effect over the entire 
distribution.   32
 













































4.  Pro-Poorness 
 
  The profile of economic growth and poverty outlined in section 2 of this paper for 
the 1996-2007 period clearly indicates that economic growth was accompanied by 
significant poverty reduction between 1996 and 2001 and that poverty barely decreased 
between 2001 and 2007.  How desirable is this outcome socially?  Any answer to this 
question is relative to the chosen social evaluation function.  We propose to base our 
assessment on the concept of pro-poorness.  Generally speaking, a pattern of economic 
growth is pro-poor if it induces an outcome that is favorable to the poor, in some sense.  
Fundamentally, assessing the pro-poorness of economic growth is an exercise in social 
evaluation to the extent that it ranks social states (represented by growth incidence 
curves) on the basis of variations in individual and social welfare attributable to the 
underlying process.  We therefore need to specify an impact indicator both at the 
individual and social level and a decision rule for ranking growth patterns.   33
  In our case, individual welfare at the household level is measured by per adult 
equivalent expenditure, which we call y.  If  stands for the mean of y, then following 
Essama-Nssah and Lambert (2009), we choose to measure the impact of growth on 
individual welfare by the point elasticity (or responsiveness) of y with respect to .  We 
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y q   where  ) ln(  d  , the 
growth rate of the mean of y.  The function q(y) defines a growth pattern and is 
essentially a normalized growth incidence curve (GIC)
26. 
  The next component of the evaluation framework entails the specification of an 
aggregation rule that translate individual outcomes into social impact.  Poverty-focused 
evaluation requires that we pay special attention to the outcomes of the poor.  We 
translate this concern for the poor by choosing evaluative weights implied by the class of 
additively decomposable poverty measures defined by (2.1).  Thus the poverty impact of 
a change in individual welfare is equal to: dy z y z y d ) | ( ) | (      where  ) | ( z y    is the 
first-order derivative with respect to x of the chosen indicator of individual deprivation.  
Let  y z y y ) | ( ) (      , then the poverty impact can be linked to a growth pattern as 
follows. 
 
 ) ( ) ( ) | ( y q y z y d            ( 4 . 2 )  
 
In the above expression, we interpret the coefficient of q(y) as the social value (or social 
weight) attached to individual outcome q(y) by the chosen evaluation function.  We 
obtain an indicator of social impact by averaging individual cases defined by (4.2) as 
                                                 
26 Ravallion and Chen’s (2003) growth incidence curve shows the growth rate of income at the p
th quantile 
of income distribution.  It is defined by the following expression ) ln( ) ( y d p g   where   
y
dt t f p
0 ) ( , 
and  () f is the density function characterizing the distribution of income.   34
follows:  
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0 ) ( ) ( ) (  .  This indicator can be expressed as an elasticity by 
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The social impact indicator defined by equation (4.3) is the growth elasticity of the 
poverty index P for the pattern q(y)
27.  The first-order derivative of the individual 
deprivation function is assumed to be negative.  It follows that the growth elasticity of 
poverty will be negative if z y y q    0 ) ( .  In other words, an increase in economic 
welfare among the poor reduces poverty.  The issue is whether to count any poverty 
reduction as pro-poor. 
Table 4.1.  Shapley Decomposition of the Growth Elasticity of Poverty 
 
 Overall Scale Inequality
 1996-2001 
Headcount  -1.34 -1.29  -0.05 
Poverty Gap  -1.88 -1.85  -0.04 
Squared Poverty Gap -2.25 -2.27  0.02 
Watts  -2.00 -2.02  0.02 
 2001-2007 
Headcount  -0.24 -0.10  -0.13 
Poverty Gap  -1.27 -0.17  -1.10 
Squared Poverty Gap -3.35 -0.22  -3.13 
Watts  -2.54 -0.19  -2.35 
 1996-2007 
Headcount  -1.39 -1.29  -0.10 
Poverty Gap  -2.10 -1.93  -0.17 
Squared Poverty Gap -2.77 -2.45  -0.32 
Watts  -2.40 -2.14  -0.26 
   Source: Authors’ Calculations 
 
  Osmani (2005) argues that poverty-reducing growth should not be regarded as 
inevitably pro-poor given a general dissatisfaction with the scale of poverty reduction 
                                                 
27 See Essama-Nssah and Lambert (2009) for a formal proof.  These authors also show that the growth 
elasticity of the headcount index is equal to  H
z f z zq
q H
) ( ) (
) (   
. 
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brought about by past growth experience in developing countries.  He recommends that 
economic growth be considered pro-poor if it achieves an absolute reduction in poverty 
greater than it would be in a benchmark case
28.  Such a benchmark could be either a 
counterfactual or a desirable growth pattern.  We follow Osmani’s recommendation and 
choose a distribution-neutral growth pattern as a benchmark.  Thus economic growth is 
considered pro-poor for a poverty index P if it induces an absolute reduction in poverty 
greater than would a distribution neutral pattern. Kakwani and Son (2008) also propose 
an alternative benchmark where the benefits of growth are shared equally by every 
member of society. We consider this alternative later on.  
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28 Some authors such as Kakwani and Pernia (2000) consider economic growth pro-poor only when the 
income of the poor grows faster than that of the rich.  This is the so-called relative approach to pro-
poorness.  The absolute approach takes into consideration changes in both the rate of growth and the 
distribution of gains.  In that perspective economic growth is pro-poor if it leads to poverty reduction for 
some choice of a poverty measure (e.g. Ravallion and Chen 2003).  Kakwani and Son (2008) provide a full 
characterization of various measures of pro-poorness.   36
  Under distributional neutrality, the elasticity of y with respect to  is equal to 1 
for all y.  We can therefore represent the corresponding growth pattern as y y q  1 ) ( 0 .  
In that case, the growth elasticity of poverty is equal to:   
z
P dy y f z y y
P
q
0 0 ) ( ) | (
1
) (   .  
In fact there is a Shapley decomposition of the overall growth elasticity of poverty into 
scale and inequality components.  The scale component is equal to the growth elasticity 
under distributional neutrality.  Let ] 1 ) ( [ ) (   y q y  , then the inequality component can 
be written as:   
z
P dy y f y z y y
P 0 ) ( ) ( ) | (
1
) (     .  We can therefore rewrite expression 
(4.3) as follows. 
       
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) (        (4.4) 
 
The results of this decomposition for Cameroon based on the method described in 
Kakwani and Son (2008) are presented in table 4.1.  For a given poverty index, the 
decision to declare a growth pattern pro-poor hinges fundamentally on the magnitude of 
the overall growth elasticity relative to that of its scale component.  The results presented 
in table 4.1 indicate that in absolute terms poverty has been generally more responsive to 
changes in mean welfare than in its distribution except for the sub-period 2001-2007 
when the inequality component dominates the scale component in absolute value.   37
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  A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for a growth pattern to be pro-poor for a 
specific poverty index is to have  z y y q   1 ) (  (Essama-Nssah and Lambert 2009).  
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 depict the pattern of economic growth in Cameroon between 1996 
and 2007.  Given the level of poverty incidence in 1996, 2001 and 2007, and the 
configuration of these curves up to the headcount, it is obvious that we cannot infer pro-
poorness using this sufficiency condition.  The growth pattern curve crosses the 
benchmark several times before the relevant headcount levels.  We must resort to specific 
indicators of pro-poorness to determine the extent to which economic growth in 
Cameroon has been pro-poor.   38
 
Table 4.2 Indicators of Pro-Poorness, 1996-2007 
 
  Relative Measure  Absolute Measure 
  1996-2001 2001-2007 1996-2007 1996-2001 2001-2007 1996-2007 
Headcount  1.04 2.40 1.08 0.68 1.54 0.69 
Poverty  Gap  1.02 7.47 1.09 0.47 3.13 0.48 
Squared Poverty Gap  0.99  15.23  1.13  0.39  5.55  0.43 
Watts  0.99  13.37 1.12 0.38 5.22 0.45 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
 
  Table 4.2 presents indicators of pro-poorness for the period under consideration 
for the headcount ratio and poverty measures from the additively decomposable class.  
The relative measure of pro-poorness is equal to the overall poverty elasticity divided by 
its scale component.  A pattern of growth is judged pro-poor if this measure is greater 
than one and the growth rate is positive.  On the basis of the values for this indicator 
presented in table 4.2, we conclude that the amount of poverty reduction obtained 
between 1996 and 2001 barely matches what would have been achieved under 
distributional neutrality.  Therefore economic growth in Cameroon was not pro-poor for 
that period relatively speaking.  The same indicator shows that growth was pro-poor 
between 2001 and 2007.  However, this conclusion should provide no comfort to 
policymakers given that the mean per adult equivalent expenditure grew only 0.5 percent 
on average in real terms.  Sustaining a real growth rate of about 2 percent per year 
between 1996 and 2007 would have produced a relatively pro-poor growth path. 
  The absolute measure reported in table 4.2 is defined by Kakwani and Son (2008) 
as the ratio of the overall poverty elasticity to the neutral absolute growth elasticity of 
poverty.  The latter is the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth subject to the 
benefits of growth being shared equally by every member of society.  The growth process 
is pro-poor in the absolute sense if this ratio is greater than one.  Our results show that 
economic growth in Cameroon was not pro-poor in the absolute sense between 1996 and 
2001.  It was pro-poor between 2001 and 2007, though the rate of growth was very weak 
over that period.   39
 



























  Finally, we consider the incidence of economic growth on the following 
components of household expenditure between 2001 and 2007: food, health, education 
and clothing.  Figure 4.3 portrays that incidence in terms of the elasticity of each 









k  .  This figure 
reveals that only the incidence curve for food expenditure lies above the benchmark past 
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(2009) for the corresponding decomposition of various measures of pro-poorness.   40
the headcount level.  Household spending on education fell significantly below the 
benchmark for the majority of poor households (more than half) and sharply declined 
between the 60
th and the 70
th percentile (a fact we cannot yet explain).  The figure also 
shows that there was a sharp reduction in spending on health and clothing. 
 
Table 4.3. Gini (Income ) Elasticity by Expenditure Component 
 
Inequality Aversion  Food Health Education Clothing Other Non-Food 
 2001 
2 0.74  1.21  1.18  1.06  1.20 
3 0.79  1.18  1.19  1.05  1.16 
4 0.82  1.16  1.19  1.04  1.13 
5 0.84  1.15  1.18  1.03  1.11 
6 0.86  1.14  1.17  1.02  1.10 
 2007
2 0.68  1.08  1.08  1.03  1.25 
3 0.72  1.09  1.12  1.01  1.21 
4 0.75  1.09  1.14  1.01  1.19 
5 0.77  1.09  1.15  1.01  1.17 
6 0.78  1.09  1.15  1.01  1.16 
  Source: Authors’ Calculations 
 
  To reconcile these changes in the pattern of spending between 2001 and 2007 
with our finding that economic growth was pro-poor in that period, we consider the 
distributional characteristics of the expenditure components involved in figure 4.3.  Table 
4.3 shows the Gini elasticity for each expenditure component.  This measure is analogous 
to income elasticity and is computed as the ratio of the extended concentration coefficient 
to the overall extended Gini index (Yitzhaki 1994).  Its value depends on the chosen level 
of aversion towards inequality. 
  If a component is proportional to total expenditure, that component will have no 
particular effect on the overall inequality as the corresponding concentration index will 
equal the overall Gini coefficient.  The corresponding elasticity will thus be equal to one.  
We say that an expenditure component has a positive effect on elasticity (i.e. increases 
inequality) if it rises more than proportionately with overall expenditure.  In that case, the 
elasticity would be greater than one.  If this elasticity is less than one, then the component 
reduces overall inequality.  Table 4.3 shows that only food expenditure has a Gini 
elasticity that is less than one for all level of inequality aversion.  All non-food 
components have elasticity greater than one.  Therefore, the sharp reduction (relative to   41
overall expenditure) observed for these components between 2001 and 2007 hurt the non-
poor less than the poor, making economic growth relatively pro-poor over that period. 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
 
  The Government of Cameroon has declared poverty reduction through strong and 
sustainable economic growth the central objective of its development policy.  This paper 
therefore seeks to characterize the pattern of economic growth in Cameroon focusing on 
its poverty implications.  The constant and steady growth achieved throughout the 1970s 
and much of the 1980s earned the country the status of middle-income economy.   
However, for the past twenty years or so the country has been battling, with limited 
success, a severe socioeconomic crisis stemming from a terms-of-trade shock that hit the 
economy in the mid 1980s and the associated policy response.  Our analysis shows 
poverty fell by about 13 percentage points between 1996 and 2001.  But, between 2001 
and 2007, growth weakened significantly due to the fact that it was driven by low 
productivity sectors in the informal segment of the economy.  Poverty incidence fell only 
by 1 percentage point over that period. 
  A decomposition of changes in poverty outcomes over time shows that the pure 
growth effect dominates the inequality effect, except for the sub-period 2001-2007.   
Furthermore, the meager reduction in poverty observed in 2001-2007 is mostly due to a 
modest reduction in inequality.  An application of the same methodology to deviations of 
regional poverty from the national level reveals a great deal of heterogeneity in the 
incidence of growth on poverty.  Four regions out of 12 experienced significant increases 
in poverty between 2001 and 2007 while overall poverty tended to decline.  We also find 
that, except for three regions, the real income effect dominates the inequality effect in 
explaining the divergence between regional and national poverty. 
  A generalized Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of distributional changes between 
2001 and 2007 reveals that the weak performance of the economy over that period was 
mainly driven by the negative effect of the returns to household endowments.  This 
supports the view that growth did not occur in high productivity sectors of the formal 
economy.  Looking closely at the pattern of these returns, we find that formal sector   42
employment, access to credit, education and urban residence have highly positive and 
statistically significant impact on household welfare across quantiles.  Male-headed 
households fared better than female-headed ones in 2007 but not in 2001.  Similarly, 
having at least one migrant in the household made no difference in 2001, but in 2007 it 
had a positive and significant effect on welfare across quantiles. 
  One finding that stands out above all else is that urban bias and regional disparity 
are the hallmarks of the pattern of economic growth in Cameroon.  The urban-rural 
differential is increasing across quantiles and is much steeper at the top of the 
distribution.  In 2001 these differences were mostly explained by differences in the 
distribution of characteristics, but in 2007 it appears that the differential is driven by 
differences in returns to household endowments.  In addition, we note that households 
engaged in smallholder agriculture are worse off across quantiles and across years.  Yet 
agriculture once was the main engine of growth even though its contribution to poverty 
reduction is debatable. 
  Has economic growth been pro-poor in Cameroon?  Pro-poorness is in the eyes of 
the beholder as it were.  It depends on the value judgments underlying the evaluation.  
We considered two basic interpretations of pro-poorness.   The first is fundamentally 
relative.  It declares a pattern of growth pro-poor (for a given poverty index) if it reduces 
poverty more than would a distribution-neutral pattern.  The second is absolute and 
considers a pattern of growth pro-poor if it reduces poverty more than a pattern where 
benefits are shared equally among all members of society (i.e. growth is absolutely 
distribution-neutral).  Our results show that economic growth has not been pro-poor over 
the period 1996-2001 both in a relative and absolute sense.  While there is indication that 
economic growth has been relatively and absolutely pro-poor between 2001 and 2007, 
there is little comfort in this given the fact that there was hardly any growth at all.   
Furthermore, a decomposition of the overall pattern of growth shows that household 
investment in human capital (health and education) took a serious hit.  This observation 
combined with the urban bias and regional disparity noted above makes us conclude that 
overall, economic growth in Cameroon has been weakly pro-poor. 
  What is the policymaker to make of these findings?  Fundamentally, the living 
standard achieved by an individual is an outcome of the interaction between opportunities   43
offered by society and the readiness and ability of the individual to identify and exploit 
such opportunities.  The perspective of development as opportunity equalization 
promotes a level playing field where individuals have equal opportunities to pursue freely 
chosen life plans and be spared from extreme deprivation in outcomes.  A pro-poor 
growth pattern must therefore be opportunity-equalizing.  As already noted, the pattern of 
economic growth in Cameroon is characterized by urban bias, regional disparity and a 
decline of the agricultural sector.  This is evidence that opportunities are not equal and 
raises the issue of the effectiveness of the current Poverty Reduction Strategy.  There is 
therefore a need to re-examine (and possibly reform) the mechanisms governing the 
allocation of public resources (e.g. investment in infrastructure, health and education) 
designed to support individuals’ efforts to improve their standard of living. 
   44
Appendix A:  Poverty and Inequality by Region 
 
Table A1 Regional Distribution of Poverty in 2001 
 
  Headcount  Poverty Gap Squared Poverty Gap Watts  Population Share
Douala 10.89 2.07  0.72  2.61 9.70 
Yaoundé 13.34  2.66  0.86  3.27  8.72 
Adamaoua 48.38  15.39  6.38  20.31  4.47 
Center 48.18  14.97  6.63  21.05  7.85 
East 43.98  15.37  6.75  20.85  4.81 
Far North  56.29  18.84  8.18  25.34  17.74 
Coast 35.48  10.09  4.17 13.43  4.88 
North 50.08  15.50  6.36 20.43  7.26 
North West  52.48  20.90  10.70  30.83  11.52 
West 40.33  11.10  4.19 14.19  12.06 
South 31.55  7.35  2.43  9.04  3.45 
South West  33.83  10.50  4.51  14.13  7.53 
Cameroon 40.18  12.79  5.55  17.38  100.00 
  Source: Authors’ Calculations 
Table A2 Regional Distribution of Poverty in 2007 
 
  Headcount  Poverty Gap Squared Poverty Gap Watts  Population Share
Douala 5.50 0.87  0.21  1.01 9.96 
Yaoundé 5.94  0.97  0.24  1.13  9.60 
Adamaoua 52.95  14.49  5.41  18.46  5.18 
Center 41.19  9.48  3.10  11.68  7.63 
East 50.40  15.69  6.22  20.25  4.66 
Far North  65.87  24.58  11.21  33.35  18.11 
Coast 31.08  7.65  2.71  9.60  3.50 
North 63.66  20.99  8.58 27.43  9.85 
North West  51.00  16.61  6.83  21.78  10.14 
West 28.95  6.64  2.27 8.24  10.58 
South 29.25  7.37  2.65  9.31  3.24 
South West  27.51  6.87  2.47  8.65  7.55 
Cameroon 39.90  12.31  5.03  16.11  100.00 
  Source: Authors’ Calculations   45
Table A3 Regional Inequality in the Distribution of Welfare, 2001 
 
  Gini  Atkinson-1 Atkinson-2 Mean Log Deviation  Theil 
Douala  42.46 26.16  39.33  30.33  41.17 
Yaoundé  42.59 26.00  39.88  30.11  37.79 
Adamaoua  33.82 16.87  28.81  18.48  20.14 
Center  34.62 18.55  34.61  20.52  22.06 
East  34.21 17.66  31.33  19.43  20.26 
Far North  32.97 16.05  27.77  17.49  18.69 
Coast  34.19 17.62  31.36  19.39  20.24 
North  36.16 19.23  31.11  21.36  25.62 
North West  40.55 24.40  41.68  27.98  29.96 
West  31.21 14.69  25.49  15.89  17.61 
South  29.76 13.27  23.19  14.24  15.45 
South West  38.02 21.41  35.88  24.09  26.81 
Cameroon  40.41 24.00  38.82  27.45  33.75 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
 
TableA4 Regional Inequality in the Distribution of Welfare, 2007 
 
  Gini  Atkinson-1 Atkinson-2 Mean Log Deviation  Theil 
Douala  33.87 17.07 28.37  18.72  21.72 
Yaoundé  33.15 16.60 28.02  18.15  21.07 
Adamaoua  33.75 16.70 27.25  18.27  21.20 
Center  28.07 11.91 20.72  12.68  14.13 
East  32.88 15.79 26.63  17.19  18.99 
Far North  36.52 19.14 30.28  21.24  25.07 
Coast  31.86 15.33 25.71  16.64  19.26 
North  35.33 18.22 28.57  20.12  24.65 
North West  38.24 20.98 33.32  23.54  27.66 
West  29.73 13.39 23.41  14.37  15.80 
South  34.58 18.02 29.79  19.87  23.61 
South West  33.24 16.54 28.67  18.08  19.69 
Cameroon  38.96 21.94 35.82  24.77  27.88 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
 
Table A5 Shapley Decomposition of Urban- Rural Differences in 1996 
 




Headcount -11.87  -16.12  4.26 
Poverty Gap  -4.43  -8.51  4.09 
Squared Poverty Gap -2.09  -4.96  2.87 




Headcount 6.36  13.12  -6.76 
Poverty Gap  2.37  6.91  -4.53 
Squared Poverty Gap 1.12  4.10  -2.98 
Watts 3.28  10.80  -7.52 
Source: Authors’ Calculations   46
Table A6 Shapley Decomposition Urban- Rural Differences in Poverty in 2001 
 




Headcount -22.30  -22.25  -0.05 
Poverty Gap  -8.51  -8.20  -0.31 
Squared Poverty Gap -3.96  -3.80  -0.16 




Headcount 11.90  19.87  -7.97 
Poverty Gap  4.54  9.40  -4.86 
Squared Poverty Gap 2.11  5.03  -2.91 
Watts 6.35  13.94  -7.59 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
 
Table A7 Shapley Decomposition Urban- Rural Differences in Poverty in 2007 
 
 




Headcount -27.73  -22.05  -5.68 
Poverty Gap  -9.50  -7.69  -1.81 
Squared Poverty Gap -4.06  -3.44  -0.62 




Headcount 15.14  21.41  -6.27 
Poverty Gap  5.19  10.47  -5.28 
Squared Poverty Gap 2.22  5.64  -3.42 
Watts 6.88  15.34  -8.46 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
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Appendix B: Returns to Household Characteristics 
 
Table B1:  Association between Household Welfare and Characteristics (OLS), 2001 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
Constant 13.51477  0.054986  245.7851  0.0000 
Male -0.252236  0.012708  -19.84878  0.0000 
Age Head  -0.013132  0.002086  -6.294348  0.0000 
Age Head Squared  0.000115  2.13E-05  5.364778  0.0000 
Age <5 (% Household)  -0.010059  0.000376  -26.77648  0.0000 
Age 5 to < 10 (% HH)   -0.011668  0.000384  -30.39831  0.0000 
Age 10 to < 15 (% HH)  -0.012098  0.000386  -31.38033  0.0000 
Age 15 to <20 (% HH)  -0.007770  0.000312  -24.90647  0.0000 
Age  20 to <25 (%HH)  -0.002712  0.000284  -9.559997  0.0000 
Schooling (years)  0.042913  0.001502  28.57954  0.0000 
Land 0.000697  0.000255  2.730257  0.0063 
Access to Credit  0.173503  0.024411  7.107560  0.0000 
Has Migrant (s)  0.010560  0.012250  0.862027  0.3887 
Distance Nearest Hospital  -0.002191  0.000940  -2.329860  0.0198 
Distance Nearest Tarred Road -0.000401  0.000178  -2.254167  0.0242 
Public Sector  0.251825  0.026740  9.417647  0.0000 
Private Sector Formal  0.229712  0.025264  9.092582  0.0000 
Agriculture -0.112104  0.022771  -4.923096  0.0000 
Non-Agriculture Informal  0.043645  0.023147  1.885578  0.0594 
Unemployed -0.009947  0.030035  -0.331179  0.7405 
Urban 0.147945  0.013763  10.74932  0.0000 
Adamaoua -0.037007  0.025103  -1.474206  0.1405 
East 0.083856  0.024896  3.368302  0.0008 
Far-North 0.011048  0.021435  0.515419  0.6063 
Coast -0.003824  0.017847  -0.214292  0.8303 
North 0.103944  0.023954  4.339278  0.0000 
North-West -0.195854  0.022640  -8.650777  0.0000 
West -0.011768  0.021172  -0.555841  0.5783 
South -0.066760  0.023641  -2.823927  0.0048 
South-West -0.135006  0.024006  -5.623858  0.0000 
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Table B2:  Association between Household Welfare and Characteristics (OLS), 2007 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
Constant 13.56208  0.048448  279.9298  0.0000 
Male 0.267855  0.026378  10.15431  0.0000 
Age Head  -0.016445  0.001826  -9.004842  0.0000 
Age Head Squared  0.000139  1.86E-05  7.481732  0.0000 
Age <5 (% Household)  -0.008335  0.000326  -25.58600  0.0000 
Age 5 to < 10 (% HH)   -0.011623  0.000357  -32.53275  0.0000 
Age 10 to < 15 (% HH)  -0.011045  0.000352  -31.36243  0.0000 
Age 15 to <20 (% HH)  -0.006998  0.000278  -25.21718  0.0000 
Age  20 to <25 (%HH)  -0.003273  0.000244  -13.40387  0.0000 
Schooling (years)  0.034182  0.001391  24.56746  0.0000 
Land 0.000597  0.000248  2.403839  0.0162 
Access to Credit  0.126968  0.020147  6.301943  0.0000 
Has Migrant (s)  0.082713  0.011060  7.478536  0.0000 
Distance Nearest Hospital  -0.000531  0.000468  -1.135817  0.2561 
Distance Nearest Tarred Road -0.000296  0.000184  -1.613524  0.1067 
Public Sector  0.166832  0.025839  6.456619  0.0000 
Private Sector Formal  0.131884  0.025976  5.077098  0.0000 
Agriculture -0.176951  0.021780  -8.124541  0.0000 
Non-Agriculture Informal  -0.041567  0.021050  -1.974723  0.0483 
Unemployed -0.012119  0.037286  -0.325021  0.7452 
Urban 0.264181  0.012585  20.99248  0.0000 
Adamaoua 0.020208  0.025173  0.802760  0.4221 
East -0.012617  0.024691  -0.510984  0.6094 
Far-North -0.047467  0.019496  -2.434630  0.0149 
Coast -0.188228  0.023752  -7.924789  0.0000 
North -0.072705  0.022931  -3.170551  0.0015 
North-West -0.030746  0.018423  -1.668934  0.0952 
West -0.016742  0.019021  -0.880175  0.3788 
South 0.028901  0.025313  1.141725  0.2536 
South-West 0.079206  0.019463  4.069534  0.0000 
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